FOR NEARLY A DECADE, money stock objectives have been announced publicly by the Federal Reserve Board, and, for much longer, observers have focused on the money stock as an indicator or guide to monetary policy. Also in the past decade, the financial system has undergone rapid change-through spontaneous market developments and regulatory reforms-and this change has implications for the relationship between money and other macroeconomic variables. The public has been offered a growing array of new or modified financial assets, including assets that can be used for making payments. Negotiable orders of withdrawal (NOW accounts), which are functionally equivalent to demand deposits except that they yield interest, have spread nationwide over this period; moreover, in early 1983 interest-rate ceilings were lifted on those NOW accounts that qualify, in terms of size, as Super NOWs. In addition, money market mutual funds have become widely available over this period, and the money market deposit account has been introduced; both have limited checking privileges and other transactions capabilities. Management of cash has also been facilitated by greatly improved availability of other liquid investments, such as overnight repurchase agreements and Eurodollars.
organizations offer consumers lines of credit that are secured by equity in real estate or holdings of securities, many of which are accessible by check.
At the same time, the payments system has been changing-most visibly in the form of electronic funds transfers-and with these changes the effective cost of making transactions has been declining, thereby encouraging other adjustments to portfolio behavior. Meanwhile, depositors have responded to the generally high level of interest rates that have prevailed since the latter part of the 1970s by intensifying efforts to reduce holdings of monetary assets having relatively low or zero explicit yields.
Under these circumstances, it would be surprising if the moneyincome relationship had not been disturbed or altered. This paper examines recent and prospective changes to the relationship among money, interest rates, and income, focusing on the MI measure of the money stock. Even though reduced policy weight has been given to MI in the past couple of years, observers have continued to direct much of their attention to this aggregate. Also, a number of the changes affecting MI are affecting the broader measures of the money stock as well; indeed, with regard to the effects of deregulation of interest rate ceilings, the broader measures might be viewed as being in a more advanced state of evolution. ' In the next section I present a variety of evidence suggesting that the MI-income relationship has indeed been changing over the past decade, especially over the past few years. The evidence of change is followed by a more detailed investigation of the large rise in MI relative to income in 1982-83, focusing on the role of NOW accounts. From there I examine likely future changes to the financial system that can be expected to influence the money-income relationship both in a transitional and a permanent way and thus affect the reliability of the money stock as a guide to policy. In the final section I focus on the likely contours of the money-income relationship once the system has adapted to current and prospective change. In particular, I examine the following questions: Can the narrow money stock be a reliable guide to policy? If so, what are the implications of changes in the financial system for setting and adjusting money stock objectives and monetary control procedures? 
Empirical Evidence
A variety of empirical evidence suggests that changes in the availability of financial assets, in the opportunity costs of holding money balances, and in transactions costs have disrupted and altered the relation between money stock measures and the economy. Around the mid1970s, and again in 1981, times when interest rates were falling, MI grew slowly relative to the gross national product; there evidently were large downward shifts in the demand for narrow money balances during these periods.2 The strong rise in MI velocity was followed by its exceptional weakness through 1983:1. Velocity of Ml contracted at an unprecedented 5.5 percent annual rate from 1981:4 to 1983:1 and expanded at only about a 2 percent annual rate over the remainder of 1983, an unusually sluggish expansion during the early stage of economic recovery.
Econometric evidence confirms the impression that the moneyincome relationship has departed recently from historical norms. Table  1 3. Reduced-form equations of this type do not incorporate explicitly an interest rate influence on the money-income relationship but incorporate such an influence only indirectly through growth in money and the fiscal variable. To the extent that the reducedform relationship is misspecified, predictive performance will diminish relative to that of a better-specified money demand equation-with the predictive performance tending to erode directly with the size of the interest-elasticity of money demand. Consequently, for a given Em,jo the elasticity of the demand for components having a fixed own yield will be greater than for those having a zero yield. The interest elasticities in the nonlinear model can be summarized briefly. The level of the elasticity of money demand with respect to the opportunity cost, Em,ic, varies directly with the size of the opportunity cost. Thus Emio is smaller for NOW accounts than for demand deposits. However, a larger Ejo,j associated with NOW accounts more than offsets the lower elasticity with respect to the opportunity cost, yielding a higher elasticity of demand for ordinary NOW accounts with respect to the market rate. By contrast, the miodel yields an elasticity of demand for Super NOWs with respect to market rates below that of both demand deposits and ordinary NOWs. If the yield on Super NOWs is proportional to the market rate, then Ejo,j will be unity and the market-rate elasticity for Super NOWs will equal their opportunity cost elasticity, Emio. But in the empirical nonlinear model, E,njo is small when the spread of the market rate over the own rate is narrow, so that the market rate elasticity for Super NOWs is also low. It is important to note that the revised model implies that the elasticity of the demand for MI with respect to the open market rate has changed with the growing importance of NOW accounts; market-rate interest elasticity has risen, according to this model, as the proportion of NOW accounts subject to fixed ceilings has grown. The revised model also implies that in the future the market rate elasticity will fall as the proportion of MI that is subject to an unregulated own rate grows; the model predicts the drop in elasticity because of the direct relationship between the (absolute value of) Emio and the level of the opportunity cost, which diminishes as more MI earns an unregulated rate of interest, and because of the decline toward unity in Eio,i as regulatory restrictions on the own rate are removed. The San Francisco model implies that MI velocity will vary more with swings in interest rates than historical analysis over longer periods would suggest, even though the opportunity cost of holding MI deposits will tend to vary less as the process of deregulation continues. As a consequence, this approach would suggest that relatively large variations in money stock growth objectives will be required to stabilize income The public is likely to be much less responsive to proportionate changes in the opportunity cost of holding MI balances when the level of the opportunity cost is very small, as in this example, than when it is large. Consequently, the elasticity of MI with respect to the open market rate is likely to be relatively small once the deregulation of MI deposits is complete, a property embodied in the nonlinear quarterly model discussed in the previous section.
With a much smaller opportunity cost of holding MI deposits, the demand for this aggregate could be buffeted more than it has been by shifting preferences for assets. The cost of retaining in MI the proceeds of maturing assets or asset sales before reinvesting would be reduced, and MI deposits would become a more attractive repository of speculative balances when depositors anticipate that longer-term rates will rise.9 Other factors affecting the demand for liquidity, such as shifting concerns about the outlook for employment and earnings, may come to play'a more important role in affecting the demand for MI as it becomes a more attractive portfolio asset. In late 1981 and early 1982 the demand for NOW accounts, passbook savings, and other very liquid assets in household portfolios strengthened (while transaction demands weakened and rates dropped only moderately), perhaps reflecting a desire to be better able to cushion an earnings disruption, which at that time seemed more likely. On the other hand, if the opportunity cost of holding MI balances were small, it would reduce incentives for financial institutions to introduce, and depositors to seek, M1 substitutes, thus possibly stabilizing MI holdings.
The underlying demand for narrow money is probably being affected by changing transactions costs of transferring between MI and other assets. The introduction of the money market deposit account in late 1982 lowered transactions costs. At present, all types of depositors have this convenient and highly attractive liquid alternative to holding MI deposits. Funds can be placed in these accounts for as short as overnight 9. Viewed alternatively, the reduction in the opportunity cost of holding MI balances results in a widening of the trigger points that prompt investment of Ml balances (when the upper point of the Ml holding range is reached) and liquidation of an asset to replenish such balances (when the lower point is reached). Consequently, holdings of Ml balances are likely to vary more with all types of transactions-those associated both with income and with the exchange of all types of assets. Also, shifting rate expectations-which need not be universally or even widely held-would contribute to fluctuations in the demand to hold MI balances. and transferred by telephone or automatic teller machine to a checking account at the same institution; moreover, the accounts are insured to $100,000 and have a principal that is fixed. I?Also, the growing availability of repurchase agreements and money market mutual funds, most of which have convenient withdrawal privileges, has been adding to the number of attractive, low transactions cost, liquid investments available as outlets for excess MI balances. Convenient, low-cost, revolving credit arrangements, which have become increasingly available to both households and firms, similarly enable depositors to hold smaller amounts of transactions deposits; such credit arrangements in effect lower transactions costs, facilitating profitable investment of transactions deposits as resulting shortfalls in transactions accounts are covered by favorably priced extensions of credit. It is likely that the public is continuing to adapt its behavior to these financial developments.
THE ELECTRONIC REVOLUTION AND OTHER INFLUENCES
The recent advances in electronic payment systems promise to further reduce transaction costs and thus to alter payments practices. Automated clearing houses are handling a small but growing volume of payments, and plans are being made for same-day settlement of electronic payments messages through these centers. Many automatic teller machines and point-of-sale terminals permit the depositor to transfer funds among accounts as well as to make payments; the number of these machines is expanding rapidly, and experiments have begun involving on-line withdrawals from M I accounts using debit cards. A large and growing number of corporations currently have on-line connections to their banks that enable them to send payments messages electronically, reducing wage and salary costs at both the firm and its bank.
Beyond their impact on transactions costs, many of these electronic developments are affecting money demand by reducing uncertainty about daily receipts and expenditures. Customers having on-line systems with their banks are able to monitor more readily their balances and the transactions flowing through their accounts. Parties to automated clear-10. Restrictions apply to withdrawals from money market deposit accounts. Up to six transfers per month may be made from such accounts, no more than three by draft; however, an unlimited number of withdrawals can be made in person, including those from automatic teller machines.
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ing house transactions know in advance when funds are going to be transferred between accounts. Similarly, a move to same-day settlement of automated clearing house transactions likely will reduce cash managers' uncertainties about their collected, and thus investable, balances since more will be known about the amount of daily debits and credits to their accounts. The greater the certainty about daily receipts and expenditures, the greater is the potential for investing MI balances, assuming that opportunity costs of holding MI balances continue to encourage economization.
The responsiveness of MI to income may also be undergoing change as a result of these financial developments. Should depositors come to view MI deposits as an attractive repository of liquid balances, the demand for MI will be influenced more than previously by portfolio considerations. Inventory theories of the demand for transactions balances imply an income elasticity below unity, and standard econometric models of MI demand have in the past generally yielded estimates of long-run income elasticities that are below unity. The demand for other liquid assets, though, might be inferred to have a long-run income elasticity of unity, owing to the tendency for income to vary proportionately with wealth, which is the appropriate scale variable in portfolio models. To the extent that the income elasticity of MI demand rises toward unity, the cyclical behavior of MI can be expected to change, with growth in M1 more nearly matching growth of income, at least when averaged over several quarters. To the extent, though, that wealth influences on MI become more important, the money-income relationship in the short run could become looser since the income-wealth relationship is relatively loose in the short run.
Some Implications
As the above discussion demonstrates, rapid financial change continues to affect the behavior of MI and thus the setting of MI growth objectives. Considerable uncertainty surrounds the contours of the relationship that now exists among Ml, income, interest rates, and other economic developments and that will exist once the transition phase has drawn to a close. Both during and after the transition, the reliability of the money stock as a guide to monetary policy will be open to question.
The preceding discussion strongly suggests that the interest elasticity of MI demand will be much lower once the deregulation process has ended and that the demand to hold MI balances will continue to be "noisy," especially over short periods; in other words, MI can be expected to continue to fluctuate unpredictably for reasons that are not linked to variations in income, interest rates, or other identifiable causes. Should the relation come to be dominated by noise or by portfolio allocation considerations that are only weakly related to income and interest rates, then the issue of MI targeting might properly be relegated to discussions of monetary history; attempts to stabilize MI growth under these circumstances would only heighten income and interest rate volatility.
In the event that the relationship involving MI, income, and interest rates becomes more predictable, the reduced interest elasticity of MI demand will have implications for setting and revising monetary growth objectives. Consider first the appropriate setting of year-to-year monetary targets. With either a large or a small elasticity, the longer-term objective of reducing inflation by slowing spending growth by a steady amount each year would translate into a policy of slowing over time the rate of money growth. However, the smaller the interest elasticity of money demand, the more closely this objective corresponds to a uniform year-to-year deceleration of money stock growth at the desired rate of reduction in spending growth.11 Because of the changes in interest rates along the desired spending path, a high elasticity would require a variable rate of monetary deceleration to achieve a steady deceleration of spending growth. Indeed, with a high interest elasticity it is actually possible for the money growth target consistent with a steady deceleration of spending to rise from one year to the next; this would occur if a relatively large decline in interest rates were to occur owing, say, to a large decline in inflation expectations. With a high elasticity, this rate reduction could increase growth in the quantity of money demanded by more than the deceleration of income reduces growth in money demand. This has been referred to as the "reentry problem" associated with a successful antiinflationary policy. The acceleration of MI growth in 1982-from 5. In any event, during the course of a targeting period (currently a year) monetary and goods market disturbances will occur, affecting interest rates and income, and producing departures of money from path. With a more interest-inelastic demand for money, disturbances can lead to different outcomes for the money stock, income, and interest rates, with the difference depending on the operating procedures.
Under a reserves operating procedure, such as one focusing on the supply of nonborrowed reserves, both goods market and monetary (money demand and money supply) disturbances will have larger effects on interest rates the more inelastic is the demand for money. 12 However, for a given setting of the reserves instrument, goods market disturbances will have a smaller impact on income as larger interest rate changes cushion the impact of spending disturbances on income. The heightened impact of monetary disturbances on interest rates, though, will increase the response of income. By inducing larger changes in borrowed reserves and desired holdings of excess reserves, larger interest rate changes will produce greater departures of the money stock from path in response to disturbances from the goods market or from money demand. Departures of the money stock from path will tend to be damped, however, when there are money supply disturbances (such as shifts in excess reserve holdings, the mix of deposits with different reserve requirements, or the amount of borrowed reserves); larger rate movements will induce larger changes in borrowings and excess reserves that partially offset the impact of the money supply disturbance.
If the incidence of monetary and spending disturbances were unchanged, the monetary authorities might wish to offset the heightened When disturbances from any source lead to departures of the money stock from path, a resetting of the instrument (say, the path for nonborrowed reserves) is implied. To achieve a given expected change in interest rates and income, smaller instrument changes are implied by a less interest-elastic demand for money, because a given change in the supply of reserves will have a greater impact on interest rates. Equivalently, a longer horizon for returning the money stock toward its annual path would be implied by a smaller interest elasticity."3 Moreover, the ultimate response of the money stock to a given change in interest rates (and income) would be smaller.
Under an operating procedure that stabilizes the short-term rate of interest (such as the federal funds rate operating procedure in use before October 1979), spending or monetary disturbances will have impacts on income and the money stock that are independent of the interest elasticity of money demand. Adjustment of the interest rate instrument to departures of money from path could be made in the same way as with a higher interest elasticity. But with a lower interest elasticity, the response of the money stock to such changes in the interest rate would be smaller, because the quantity of money demanded would respond less. In other words, the rate at which the money stock returns to path would be slower and the ultimate response of the money stock to the readjustment of the instrument would be smaller.
In sum, the rapid pace of financial change in recent years and impending changes in the future give rise to uncertainties about the reliability of the narrow money stock as a guide to monetary policy, let alone the desirability of rigidly targeting monetary growth. At present, the monetary system is in transition, and the basic features of the moneyincome relationship are blurred, implying heightened uncertainty about the appropriate setting of money stock objectives. The above discussion does not predict whether uncertainty about the velocity relationship will eventually be greater or less than it was historically, although it does suggest that uncertainty will be considerable during the transition period. Once the transition has been completed, it will take time to identify the contours of the new money-income relationship and whether noise in this relationship has diminished sufficiently to warrant a narrower annual target range. The very recent tendency for M1 growth to conform closely to model forecasts, however, suggests that the relationship may be stabilizing. Some features of the money-income relationship seem more evident in the longer run, especially a lower interest elasticity of money demand.
The fundamental question regarding the usefulness of the money stock as a guide to policy once the transition is complete, though, is whether the money-income or velocity relationship will be dominated by noise in a new financial environment. A growing array of liquid alternatives to MI balances, lower transactions costs, and a greater tendency for shifting portfolio-allocation considerations to influence money holdings could add significantly to the volatility of money demand. On the other hand, these factors may prove to be unimportant and the behavior of money may once again conform relatively closely to variations in income and, to a lesser extent than previously, interest rates, implying that stabilization objectives could be achieved through control of the money stock. In the meantime, however, the considerable degree of uncertainty about velocity behavior associated with rapid change to the financial system suggests that the central bank's ability to stabilize the economy through heavy reliance on narrow money as an intermediate target probably has diminished. First, I agree entirely that-given all that has occurred since, say, 1978-it would be surprising indeed if the demand for the somewhat arbitrary collection of assets that we call MI had not shifted dramatically.
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But I would put more emphasis on the role of inflation, first, in inducing private financial innovation to get around increasingly dysfunctional regulations and, second, in persuading policymakers to change the regulations. I do not imagine that Simpson would disagree with this, but his paper does begin by mentioning "spontaneous market developments. "
Regarding shifts in money demand, I agree with Simpson entirely and never cease to be amazed at how some people still try to deny that there has been a shift in the money-income relationship. To Simpson's evidence I simply add the following data, which show that during the nine-quarter period 1981:1 to 1983:1 there was actually a remarkably strong negative correlation between money growth and nominal GNP growth.
Year
Quarterly Simpson's discussion of the effect of institutional change on interest elasticities is both useful and germane. His main point is that the introduction of conventional NOW accounts (which pay a fixed, but positive, rate of interest) should be expected to raise the elasticity of money demand with respect to the market interest rate, but the spread of Super NOWs (which pay a floating rate) should be expected to lower it.
But the Federal Reserve's nonlinear model apparently does more than this; it actually makes the elasticity with respect to the opportunity cost vary with the size of opportunity cost. Simpson shows that the nonlinear model fits the recent episode better than the standard one. What we would like to know, of course, is whether this is simply a result of successful curve-fitting or really tells us something about behavior. For this reason, it would be nice to have a rationale for the nonlinear specification.
Talking about the future is much more fun than talking about the past; we need not be constrained by facts. For the most part, Simpson's crystal ball seems reasonable to me. I am confident, as he is, that the fraction of balances subject to interest rate regulations will shrink over time.
Will Some proposals wind up putting an intermediate target for monetary policy on the left-hand side, and it seems to me that two of the principal candidates for this honor now are credit and the real rate of interest.2 Benjamin Friedman has written extensively about credit, so I will say nothing more about that except to reiterate the Kaldor-Goodhart-LucasMurphy critique: finding a constant credit-income ratio during a period in which the Federal Reserve is not controlling credit does not imply that the ratio will remain constant once credit in the aggregate is being controlled.
Since economists seem to have ignored targeting of real interest rates, let me advertise an interesting working paper by Paul Jenkins and Carl Walsh.3 They construct a Poole-type model with flexible prices and rational expectations and show that there is a strong case for real interest rate targeting-I do not mean pegging-if financial sector shocks are the dominant source of disturbances. This formalizes an intuitive notion that some of us have had for a long time: that real interest rate targeting might make sense in a regime of rapid financial innovation. It may be an idea that deserves more thought than it has been given to date.4
General Discussion
James Duesenberry pointed out that the adaptation of the moneyincome relationship to deregulation might have a long way yet to go. The velocity of MI was about two at the end of World War II, when the opportunity cost of MI was very low because market rates were low. Velocity tripled in the period when rising market rates and continued regulation widened the opportunity cost of MI. Now, if the opportunity cost is going to be very small again as a result of deregulation, velocity could conceivably trend all the way back to its early postwar level. It was impossible to forecast whether such a huge change would take place; but the uncertainty about where the money-income relationship would head would be very great for an indeterminate period of time.
Robert Hall viewed the instability of the money-income relationship as permanent rather than as just a transitional problem. With MI bearing a return closely related to market returns, it becomes a much closer substitute for other assets in the economy. The instability of velocity, which he regarded as a substantial problem throughout U.S. history, will thus become even greater and will apply to any monetary aggregate, because all will be more substitutable for other assets as the result of deregulation. Benjamin Friedman observed that there is some evidence that wealth has historically helped to explain the demand for money. As of a nominal GNP target a step further, arguing that such a formula could never be expected to guide what is essentially a political-economic process. Like Phelps, he questioned whether we should always, or even usually, want to change real GNP by 1 percent to offset every 1 percent shock to the price level. But even for the longer run, periods when inflation control is the main political concern would alternate with periods when mass unemployment is the major worry. Controlling nominal GNP is currently popular because it puts a ceiling on inflation; but at other times it might limit the improvement in employment that could be accomplished when that is the major problem. Duesenberry also warned that policy could not use debt as an instrument of control because, short of instituting credit controls, policy could not control debt directly; furthermore, the observed correlation between debt and nominal GNP came largely from GNP giving rise to debt.
Bryant argued for a sharper distinction between ultimate targets for policy and the instruments used to try to achieve those targets, and between instrument choice and the procedures used to vary the instruments. A rule for policy could pertain only to an instrument. Bryant argued against an instrument rule and advocated an eclectic approach to policy that allows the Federal Reserve to look at and respond to a number of developments. The long-run benefits of a credible policy commitment could perhaps be realized by a policy stance that promised to react to some types of economic disturbances but to remain passive in the face of others. Such a "halfway" approach to discretionary policy might be a constructive compromise between the rigidity of simple rules and the possible credibility problems associated with unconstrained activism.
Thomas Simpson defended the case for monetary targeting, although with more flexibility than many of its advocates would permit. He reasoned that monetary targeting provides the public with timely information about monetary developments. If actual outcomes differ from target, the public can infer either that actual economic developments will be different than they had expected, or that policymakers will explain why there had been a change in the relationship between these developments and the monetary targets. In this process, the monetary authorities will be sensitive to the public's preferences and will, before long, alter their targets if public preferences demand it. Simpson regarded the episode of 1979-83 as an example of this kind of role for monetary targeting.
